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PARETO VERSUS WELFARE
BY ROBERT HOCKETT*
Many normatively oriented economists, legal academics and other policy analysts appear
to be “welfarist” and Paretian to at least moderate degree: They deem positive responsiveness to
individual preferences, and satisfaction of one or more of the familiar Pareto criteria, to be
reasonably undemanding and desirable attributes of any social welfare function (SWF) employed
to formulate social evaluations. Some theorists and analysts go further than moderate welfarism
or Paretianism, however: They argue that not simply liberal values, but “the Pareto principle”
itself requires the SWF be responsive to individual preferences alone – a position I label “strict”
welfarism – and conclude that all social evaluation should in consequence be formulated along
strictly welfarist lines. I show that no strictly welfarist social welfare function can give complete
expression to a normative social evaluation, as distinguished from simply describing a social
allocation. I show also that SWFs employed to formulate complete social evaluations must
accordingly, in virtue of the entailment relations obtaining among strict welfarism and the several
Pareto criteria when these latter are interpreted along preference-regarding lines, be constructed
without regard to Weak, Strong or Indifferentist Pareto. The results derived here generalize
Arrow’s (1951), Sen’s (1970), and cognate impossibility results.
Keywords: Pareto, Paretianism, welfare, welfarism, welfare economics, social welfare
function, social choice, impossibility result.

1. INTRODUCTION
PARETIAN CRITERIA FOR SOCIAL EVALUATION have been with us for about a century now.
(See Pareto (1909).) The principal reason for their persistence of course is that they are
widely perceived, at first blush at any rate, to be normatively “attractive.” (See, e.g.,
Basu (1984), Sen (2003), Tungodden (2003).)
Pareto’s attractions for their part are not altogether mysterious. If a shift from one
law or policy set to another stands to render one or more people better off and nobody
worse off, why wouldn’t “we” undertake it? Abstention would seem to forgo a costless
increase in something that, as the term “better” suggests, is “good.” That would in turn
be a thing we can plausibly think of, as “good’s” adverb “well” certainly invites, as
“well-being” or “welfare.”1 Needless surrender of welfare for its part would seem to be
wasteful, a gratuitously occasioned opportunity-cost. It is scarcely surprising in this light
that so-called “Weak” and “Strong” Paretian criteria, which trade on the picture just
sketched, are widely described as “efficiency” criteria.2
Weak and Strong Pareto, of course, do not exhaust the menu of Paretian
attractions. Distinctly but near as compellingly comes this thought: If no individual in a
*
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1
“Welfare” derives from “well faring,” the “fare” here in turn stemming from French “faire,”
meaning to do or to make. One is “faring” well when one is “doing” well, which is when “things are well”
with one.
2
Strong and Weak Pareto are duly formalized infra, Section V.
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particular society fares better under one given law or policy set than some other,
shouldn’t “society as a whole” be considered indifferent as between the two sets? Surely
a society’s faring well, ill, or indifferent is derivative in some sense of its individual
members’ thus faring. Permitting a measure of social welfare to vary in response to
matters apart from such person-centered groundings, moreover, would seem to invite
fetishism or “perfectionism” of some sort. (See, e.g., Arneson (1990), Hurka (2002),
Rawls (1971), Sen (1979). Also Hockett (2009a, b, c).) We abandoned that sort of thing
long ago, along with state-sponsored religion and cognate public teloi. We did that at
least partly on grounds that respect for our fellows as agents demands we respect their
autonomy in judging their own good. So-called “Pareto Indifference” is thus often taken
to give fair expression to widely accepted, modern “liberal” or “individualist” values.3
(See, e.g., Samuelson (1947). But see also Sen (1970a). See generally Hockett (idem.).)
Considerations of the sorts just articulated generally prompt social welfare
theorists, as well as some economically trained legal and policy analysts, to take one or
more of the familiar Pareto criteria legitimately to constrain the construction of those
social welfare functions, functionals, orderings, quasi-orderings, partial orderings, and
cognate metrics in which they couch much of their research. (See, e.g., Adler (2007),
Kaplow & Shavell (2002). See generally Arrow (1951), d’Aspremont (2002), Samuelson
(1947), Sen (1970b), Sen (1986). Also Hockett (idem.).) Satisfaction of one or more
flavors of Pareto is considered a reasonably minimal condition to impose upon any
plausible method employed in the comparative normative evaluation of possible states of
the world, including states of the world effected or affected by law and policy. (Idem.)
It might not be immediately apparent from the foregoing considerations as thus
worded, however, precisely what normative work Pareto is doing in such social
evaluations as are made to comport with it. More precisely, it might not be apparent what
work Pareto is not doing.
The notions of “better” and “worse off” employed in the second and third
paragraphs above, upon which Pareto is transparently parasitic, are as yet still
unspecified. I have not thus far characterized any determinate mode of evaluation such
as might lend any content to the evaluative terms “good,” “well,” “better,” or “worse.” I
have not said on what grounds – pursuant to what normative standard or standards –
ascriptions of “better” and “worse,” of the sort upon which application of Pareto still
pends, might be made. I have said only that Pareto has something secondary to say about
what “we” ought to do, once those primary standards have been antecedently specified.
Pareto’s normative clutch in the meanwhile has nothing with which to engage; it awaits
an anterior driveshaft and engine.
But now I have also suggested, in effect, that at least one consideration seemingly
underwriting one of the Pareto conditions – Pareto Indifference – might well militate
against “our” antecedently specifying any such primary standard at all. For surely our
specifying the still requisite primary standard – the “driveshaft and engine” – might
violate individuals’ autonomy in judging their own good. It might do so in precisely the
illiberal way that I said modern polities tend to eschew. It isn’t only Pareto Indifference
that might raise this prospect, moreover. Inasmuch as the “veto” (per Sen (1970a, b))
latent in Strong Pareto’s “no one worse off” constraint mentioned earlier is itself
understood in autonomy-vindicating terms (see Basu (1984) on this prospect), it too
3

Pareto Indifference likewise is duly formalized infra, Section V.
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would seem hostile to “our” framing a primary standard. And if it does, then one is left
wondering on what grounds “we” might ever be able to recommend or do anything qua
“we,” since Pareto’s proscriptive, “no one worse off” operation seems to block
recognition of social teloi even as its prescriptive, “someone better off” operation awaits
them.
These observations raise an interesting question for legal, policy, and social
welfare analysis: If “we” cannot recommend or do anything consistently with Pareto,
what coherent conception of “social welfare” can there be that is consistent with Pareto?
Can any antecedently given primary standard of the sort that can underwrite a conception
of social welfare and guide social evaluation or collective action, if consistently applied
in the manner that one expects of a normative principle, comport with Paretian criteria?
I have come to believe this is possible only on two complementary conditions,
conditions that are not generally met in the voluminous Paretian literature. The first
condition is that the normative standard which does the primary work – the standard that
Pareto’s prescriptive face transparently endorses – must indeed be a standard: It must be
incumbent upon preferences rather than merely an object of preferences,4 and in this
sense must be at least partly definitive of “welfare” itself.5 The second condition, which
is really just a corollary of the first, is that the antecedently given normative standard
must be consistent with both of Pareto’s two edges, the prescriptive and the proscriptive.
We must not equivocate by first employing the primary standard to determine when one
is “better” off, and then some contrary standard – or pseudo-standard, such as
normatively unbounded preference-satisfaction – to determine when someone is “worse”
off. The “veto,” in short, must not trump the standard, lest there be no standard at all.
These conditions, if sound, are interesting, I think, because most who employ
Paretian criteria do not seem to meet them. Most seem, in particular, to read “better” and
“worse” as endorsed by Paretian criteria to mean none but “individually preferred” and

4

One often hears claims to the effect that the apparatus of SWFs can accommodate “preferences
for justice,” “tastes for fairness,” and so forth. These locutions signal, I think, a misapprehension of the
logic of normative standards qua standards. Standards can of course be preferred, and one can prefer to act
in conformity to standards. But standards are standards by dint of their incumbency even on those who
prefer contrariwise. You may prefer, for example, not to put all of us at risk by driving at 120mph through
our neighborhood. But the speed limit’s being a “limit” is its applicability even in the event of your
preferring to speed.
5
It is worth noting once more here the inherently evaluative nature of words such as “welfare” and
its cognates, which the root “well” – adverbial form of the word “good” – indeed immediately suggests.
“Social welfare” must surely import some conception of “wellness” that “we” – the “society” in question –
can agree upon. As emerges below, the minimally intrusive such conception is one to which a conception
of fairness sufficient to prompt an SWF’s argument domain and aggregation rule is anterior.
In this connection it bears noting that there is a venerable doctrine, associated with Rawls (1971),
to the effect that “the right” – justice – enjoys a form of “priority” relative to “the good” – welfare. I do not
think this articulation does full justice to justice. In light of what emerges below, the right is not so much
“prior” to the good, in the sense of capacity to “trump” it, so much as it is what I shall call “internal” to it.
That is to say there just is no coherent social conception of “good” in relation to which a
conception of distributive propriety – fairness, or justice – incumbent on individual preferences is not
constitutive. Fairness, which finds expression in a social welfare function or cognate metric’s argument
domain and aggregation rule, is accordingly as it were the genetic or logical structure of welfare in the
same sense that the metric itself is the measure of welfare.
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“—dispreferred,” on a person by person basis.6 That means they have no primary
normative standard with which prescriptive Pareto can engage. And it means that
proscriptive Pareto would veto, in any event, any such standard as they might wish to
proffer. And this means in turn, I’ve effectively claimed, that their “preferential
Paretianism,” as I shall call it, prevents their would-be normative social evaluation itself
– which in turn is to say that it rules out any coherent conception of social “welfare”
itself.
I can best explicate and substantiate these claims, as well as elaborate their fuller
significance, by reference to a two-sided puzzle that is raised when ever a particular
social welfare metric – in this case, the familiar Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function (SWF), whose continuity features render it intuitively most readily tractable – is
made to comport with Pareto on the one hand, but not the standard-based conditions I
have stated on the other. The puzzle takes the form of an indeterminacy in one case, a
contradiction in the other.
The indeterminacy arises from the want of any clear means of deciding upon an
SWF’s argument domain or aggregation rule in the absence of some preferenceincumbent normative standard.7 That should be disturbing to would-be “welfarist” – i.e.,
strictly preference-regarding8 – normative legal theorists and policy analysts because the
argument domain and aggregation rule are “where the action is” so far as any SWF meant
to bear normative legal or policy significance is concerned.9
The contradiction, for its part, arises from cashing out Pareto in terms of
preference-satisfaction even after having settled upon some such preference-incumbent
standard as can determine an SWF’s argument domain and aggregation rule. This will be
disturbing to anyone wishing to continue honoring Paretian constraints in constructing
their SWFs, while interpreting these – that is, while reading “better” and “worse off” – in
terms of individual preference-satisfaction alone. But as we’ll see, there is no reason to
wish to do this. Indeed, for any who believe in right and wrong, or good and ill, there is
every reason to wish against it.
The remainder of the analysis proceeds as follows. The next Section, Section 2,
briefly reprises the standard Bergson-Samuelson SWF model. As noted a moment ago,
6

Note that, if we do not read Pareto in this, what I shall call “preference-based” or “preferential”
way, there seems little point in employing Pareto at all. The “veto” appears to have been one of the
principal reasons for Strong Pareto’s introduction. See Pareto (1909).
7
In case the meaning of “preference-incumbent” has been forgotten, see supra note 4 and
associated text. Preference-incumbent normative standards are normative standards that are incumbent on
preferences – which is to say, they are standards.
8
One can deem preference-satisfaction a critical “input” to or determinant of social welfare
without thereby committing to the untenable view that it is the sole such determinant. Many who call
themselves “welfarists” today do commit to that view, however. In order to disambiguate as between
tenable and untenable preference-regarding views, I shall below introduce the term “preference-regard” for
the judgment that preference-satisfactions are determinants of social welfare, and the term “strict
preference-regard” for the untenable claim that they are the sole such determinant.
9
This might not be as immediately apparent in the case of the argument domain as it is in the case
of the aggregation rule, but it is true in both cases. The value judgment implicit in electing to quantify, in
the SWF, over all or some people’s preferences is not itself simply a preference. It is a judgment, indeed an
inherently distributive judgment like that implicit in the choice of an aggregation rule. Animals’
preferences are not counted in the social welfare aggregate by most social welfare theorists, for example.
One suspects that this is not merely because the animals have not asked.
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this is the social welfare metric most readily accessible to intuition, which is why I’ll
employ it. The results I’ll derive, however, generalize straightforwardly to more abstract
models.
Section 3 then focuses on a question raised by the standard model as currently
configured: How are the SWF’s argument domain and aggregation rule determined, and
how might such considerations as guide that determination find explicit expression in the
SWF? The upshot of this inquiry is that social welfare theorists both must and in general
do decide upon argument domains and aggregation rules, whether self-cognizantly or
otherwise, by reference to normative distributional principles that they take for incumbent
on preferences. Such principles are, in effect, the minimal “primary standards”
mentioned above upon which Pareto must ride to say anything determinate at all.
It is easy to lose sight of these principles’ preference-incumbency and welfareconstitutive role, however, in the standard apparatus as presently constituted. For this is
manifest principally in the “shape” of the SWF, and in the cut between what is and is not
included in its argument domain, all while attention tends to be drawn only to those items
that are named in the argument domain.10
In other words, though theorists must decide upon social-welfare-shaping
argument domains and aggregation rules “by reference” to preference-incumbent
normative distributional principles, they do not actually “refer” to those principles in the
idiom of SWFs themselves.11 They refer to them only in the vernacular while
constructing or justifying their SWFs, then tend to forget them, along with their role in
defining the theorist’s working conception of “welfare,” once using and thus “speaking
in,” rather than “about,” the language of their chosen SWFs. This is problematic for
purposes of “high theory” if the whole point of the SWF apparatus remains, as originally
envisaged, to give comprehensive expression to all values that enter into a social
evaluation. (On these purposes, see Bergson (1938). Also Samuelson (1947). And
Sections 2 and 6.)
Section 4 next queries what it would be to give full and explicit expression, in the
comparatively simple formal “language” of SWFs itself, to that preference-incumbent
normative standard which guides the choice or design of an SWF’s argument domain and
aggregation rule. It finds that the one means available, given the formal constraints of
standard functional notation, is not presently exploited in the standard model. The most
straightforward available means is explicitly to open a variable-space for the normative
standards in question – a space in which these values can be explicitly named – then to
deem states of the world better, ceteris paribus, in virtue of the correct such standards’
having been sought, found, and employed in the world.12
Section 5.1 then shows that, when we thus supplement the standard model in a
manner enabling it to give complete and explicit expression to the value judgments that
10

Items in the argument domain constitute, as one might say in the current “behavioralist” idiom,
the primary “focal points.”
11
The sense in which argument domains and aggregation rules are “welfare-shaping” is explained
supra, note 5, second paragraph. The thing to remember is that the SWF itself affords the measure, and in
that sense the working conception, of “welfare” employed by the theorist. Its shape is welfare’s shape.
And that shape is determined by the argument domain and aggregation rule, hence by what ever
considerations of fairness determine the latter.
12
This imparts to the SWF a recursive structure isomorphic to that of normative inquiry itself, in
which we query what we ought to do. More on this fact below.
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determine its own construction, the resulting normatively transparent SWF cannot be
exclusively “welfarist,” per the received jargon: It cannot be, that is to say, what I shall
more precisely call “strictly preference-regarding.”13 It must also, in short, be what I
shall call “standard-regarding.”14
Section 5.2 then shows that, this being the case, the normatively transparent SWF
also cannot be Paretian, if Pareto’s “better” and “worse” be interpreted, as most appear
unsurprisingly to interpret them,15 in terms not of that standard of value which has
determined the SWF’s argument domain and aggregation rule, but of individual
preferences alone. Since Pareto quite typically does seem to be interpreted in terms of
individual preferences, this result is apt to be striking. It means among other things that
most of the best-known and dreaded impossibility results in the welfare economic and
social choice literatures, from Arrow’s (1951) result on down, were all but transparently
predictable. Preferential Pareto’s exclusion of preference-incumbent norms results in
normative indeterminacy quite as a matter of course.
Section 6 briefly addressed objections that I anticipate to the fine-tuned model
constructed in Section 4, hence the results derived in Section 5. Section 7 then concludes
with a few thoughts on the future employment of SWFs in explicitly normative law,
policy, and social welfare analysis.
In anticipation of what Section 7 will ultimately conclude, I wish to emphasize up
front what I am not saying here. I am not saying that there are no good uses whatever for
preferential Paretian criteria in SWFs of any sort. I am saying, rather, that there seem to
be good grounds for purging Pareto from SWFs in at least one of what look to be three
dominant usages: Pareto should not figure into SWFs as used in their original
Bergsonian “high theory,” normative employments, as would-be “complete” formulations
of social evaluative judgments. For preferential Pareto is inimical to preferenceincumbent normativity itself.
Where, by contrast, SWFs are pragmatically employed merely as compact means
of instructing government functionaries as to what they are to do,16 or of describing
correlations between particular social allocations and associated social welfare measures,
13

See supra note 8. I use the term “strict preference-regard” where some theorists use “welfarist.”
The reason is that my expression is more explicit about what is meant.
14
It bears repeating that those who construct SWFs, if they do so for normative purposes, are
themselves standard-regarding in the sense I intend. The upshot here is thus that normatively complete
SWFs which explicitly reflect all of the theorist’s value judgments per the original Bergson-Samuelson
program (Bergson (1938), Samuelson (1947)) will be transparently standard-regarding as well, and will
accordingly not be consistently Paretian if Pareto is cashed out in terms of preferences alone.
15
The preferentialist interpretation is unsurprising because Pareto’s whole point in introducing his
criteria seems to have been to avoid difficult distributional questions. See again supra, note 6, and Pareto
(1909). That desideratum might be pragmatically justifiable in some circumstances, but we shall see there
is no reason for it in welfare theory.
16
Suppose we have reason to be confident that, so long as functionaries act as to maximize social
welfare as defined by a particular SWF, distributions of welfare-relevant resources over citizens will tend
to converge toward what those values which have prompted our SWF’s aggregation rule would deem best.
In such case we would not find occasion to worry, looking forward, about the Paretian veto’s preventing
our doing what we think normatively best. And so in that case Pareto would operate, pragmatically
speaking, as no more than an unobjectionable efficiency criterion. We would be able to view the “pie,”
that’s to say, as properly divided already, and so Pareto would say no more than to maximize the pie’s size.
Pragmatic prospect such as these, I suspect, underwrite Pareto’s intuitive appeal. Here, however, as in
other “impossibility” inquiries, our concerns will be matters more of “pure” than “applied” theory.
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there might be some room for Pareto – provided that we remain clear and explicit that
these are not normative-theoretical uses.

2. THE STANDARD MODEL
As indicated above, the analysis below proceeds by reference to the familiar apparatus of
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, which I shall accordingly briefly rehearse
in this Section.
The aim of the SWF apparatus as employed in “pure” welfare theory, since its
first introduction some seventy years ago, is to afford clarity in respect of the logical
structures and consequences of our value commitments. (See Bergson (1938),
Samuelson (1947).) It aims to do so by rendering these commitments, along with their
analytic relations, transparent. Doing this in turn is thought to enable us
straightforwardly to trace all of these commitments’ logical consequences, and
incidentally thereby to ascertain their compatibilities and incompatibilities inter se on
various possible environments.17
Familiarly, then, we shall let x (or x’, x’’, etc.) designate a possible state of the
world as viewed under a normatively complete description. A normatively complete
description includes all details that might be found salient pursuant to some standardguided method of evaluation or form of prescriptive judgment – that is, judgment
concerning a state of the world’s being “better” or “worse” than another such state.
These details can, familiarly, include facts about any number of individuals i belonging to
a defined population N of n members. It will sometimes be convenient to call x (or x’,
x’’, etc.) simply “a world,” or “possible world.”
We shall also assume that there exists a subclass Nt of those persons i among the
population N, whom we’ll call theorists (elliptical for “welfare, legal, or policy
theorists”).18 Theorists are all persons who engage in normative inquiry or investigation
with a view to determining what law and social policy ideally “should” be.
Use of the word “should” here of course suggests that theorists will typically be
bringing normative standards, or principles to bear in their theorizing, principles that
they take to be both generally applicable and ethically or morally – in a word,
normatively – apt or compelling. In many if not most cases, moreover, it is likely that
commitment to such standards, or at minimum an aim to ascertain appropriate such
standards, is what prompts and informs the theorists’ decision to engage in normative
legal or policy assessment in the first place.
It also bears noting, if only in passing, that the class of theorists Nt might
constitute the full population N (such that Nt = N), or might instead constitute a proper
subclass of N, indeed even a singleton such subclass. A parent might be the sole
normative “theorist” in a single-parent family, for example, at least for a while. An
academic or other institutionally affiliated “policy elite,” in turn, might constitute the full

17

All of the most notorious impossibility results are of course proofs of incompatibility of this
sort. See infra, Section 7.
18
“Theorists” might also be called, in keeping with a more venerable idiom, “planners,” or “the
planner.” See, e.g., Lerner (1946).
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class of theorists in some elitist or otherwise moral-labor-divided societies, while the full
citizenry might do so in some ideal ethical republic or participatory democracy.
The identity of the theorist(s), and the method of evaluative assessment employed
by – i.e., the standards or principles guiding the judgments made by – the same, are
among the facts figuring into the aforementioned normatively complete descriptions of
possible worlds. Worlds can be deemed better or worse, that is to say, by dint of who the
theorists are in those worlds, as well as by dint of there being theorists seeking, and
possibly finding, the right normative standards at all.
Now let X be the set of possible worlds invariant in N. We are interested only in
possible worlds inhabited by the n individuals i who jointly constitute N.
A social welfare function, W, is, familiarly, a (“direct,” i.e., simple, or “indirect,”
i.e., composite) mapping from the set of possible states of the world that concern us, X, to
the real line, ℝ. Formally, W: X → ℝ. As use of the term “welfare,” which, again,
derives etymologically from the notion of “faring well,” suggests, one possible, and
indeed the usual, interpretation is that W’s assigning a greater ℝ value to world x than to
world x’ corresponds to x’s being found to be in some sense “faring better than,” or
simply “better than” world x’.
An individual i’s preference function, Ui, is also a (simple or composite) mapping
from X onto ℝ, again one possible, and indeed the usual, interpretation being that greater
ℝ values correspond to some conception of “preferredness.” Formally, Ui: X → ℝ.
As noted parenthetically in the previous two paragraphs, a social welfare function
W or an individual preference function Ui can in principle be simple (“direct”) or
composite (“indirect”). Here is what that means.
Where individuals assign some worlds higher or lower real-numeric valuations
than other worlds in virtue of one or more variable properties of those worlds, they
effectively prefer worlds “indirectly.” They prefer them in virtue of their separate
attributes, in functionally composite fashion. The individual i’s preference function in
such case takes the form Ui(f1(x), …fm(x)), where each f represents a feature of x in virtue
of which it may score “more” or “less” highly in i’s preference schedule. Where m > 1 in
such case, i must of course commensurate – comparatively weight – and then aggregate f
scores in order to arrive at a scalar ℝ value to assign x.
Likewise, when a social welfare function W maps possible worlds x onto ℝ in a
manner responsive at least in part to individuals’ mappings of those worlds onto ℝ, it too
is effectively composite. It is a function, at least in part, of at least one other function –
viz. one or more individual’s or individuals’ preference function(s). It thus takes the
form, in whole or in part, W(U1(x), … Um(x)).19 Where m > 1 in such case, theorists
must of course commensurate – comparatively weight – and then aggregate Ui’s in order
to arrive at a scalar ℝ value to assign x.

19

Combining the aforementioned individual preference and social welfare cases, one should say
technically, using the standard function-compositional notation, that social welfare SW = W ◦ Ui ◦ fj for all i
and j. Because the present analysis will not hinge on the compositions of individuals’ first-order preference
functions, however, we shall take interest only in functional compositions of the form W ◦ Ui, or, rendered
more simply, W(Ui(x)).
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Decisions about how so to weight individual preference functions effectively
amount to decisions concerning distributive fairness, or justice. Such decisions, like
those concerning what indeed even to count in W’s domain of arguments at all, are
decisions concerning what makes a world better not simply per somebody’s individual
preferences, but better full stop: Such decisions are considered, if the theorist is
normatively clear about what s/he is doing, to be the “right” decisions per the theorist’s
principled, standard-governed estimation. There will be more to say of this immediately
below in Section 3.
As noted in passing through the previous several paragraphs, the internal structure
of either a social welfare function W or an individual preference function Ui can in
principle be not only “direct” (simple) or “indirect” (composite). It can also – and quite
distinctly – be multivariate, mapping vector values (either directly or indirectly) onto ℝ,
or univariate, mapping scalar values (either directly or indirectly) onto ℝ. The
multivariate cases simply are those in which m > 1 per the foregoing paragraphs:
Multiple fs in the Ui case, or multiple Uis – possibly with other arguments as well – in the
W case.
In such multivariate cases, the mappings that are the preference or social welfare
functions in question amount to mappings of pairs of vectors (n-tuples) and worlds, on
the one hand, onto single numeric values R along ℝ on the other. That is to say, they are
of the form (((f1, f2 …fn), x), R). Equivalently, one can describe these as mappings of
vectors (n-tuples) onto pairs of worlds x and numeric values R, of the form ((f1, f2 …fn),
(x, R)). These matters of commutativity are of course matters of formal convenience,
which I shall exploit below.
It will not have escaped notice that individual preference functions and social
welfare functions as just described are in a certain sense isomorphic. In effect, the social
welfare theorist models social welfare determinations much as the price theorist models
individual consumption decisions. In this sense the theorist assimilates “society,” “the
planner,” herself, or some variant of the Harsanyian (1953, 1955) “impartial observer” to
an individual choosing from a feasible set of consumption bundles.
Assimilations of this sort will not be intelligibly objectionable, of course, unless
relative to some theoretical purpose that they might frustrate. Might some such purpose
be frustrated here? I think possibly one: The standard model of an individual’s
consumption behavior is meant to be no more than descriptive. It affords formal
expression to a positive fact – the fact of the individual’s consumption decisions. It is
thus perfectly in order in this case to read-off exchange rates among vector components
as implied or implicit. Consumers need not decide beforehand, for example, that they
shall trade off but one apple for three bananas. “By their fruits ye shall know them”: We
learn the price ratios from described behavior after the fact.
The normative social welfare theorist’s purposes, I take it, are different from those
of the positive price theorist. They are not merely descriptive, but globally prescriptive in
character. The theorist purports to guide action on the part of all possible functionaries
before the fact, rather than modeling actions taken by particular consumers after the fact.
In such case the SWF’s counterpart to a preference function’s implied price ratio between
things like apples and bananas – namely, the weighting rule applied to those individual
preference functions that figure into the SWF’s argument domain – must be specified in
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advance. There is no other way to tell functionaries what to do – what precisely to
maximize and how.
This is all of it to say that the temporal “direction,” so to speak, between
aggregation and action is reversed in the prescriptive case – as was of course only to be
expected in view of that prefix – “pre-” – occurring in “to prescribe.” For specific action
determinately to be prescribed ex ante, the SWF’s aggregation rule must be rendered
explicit ex ante, rather than read off as implicit ex post. If we do no more than read it off
as implicit ex post, we are effectively doing no more that describing how the society
whose decisions we model effectively treats its members.20 We say nothing as yet in
respect of how we believe that it ought to treat its members.
Obscurity about this “directional” fact in the standard social welfare model, it is
tempting to conjecture, tends to obscure what will now emerge in Section 3, hence the
need of that minimal fine-tuning I shall make to the standard model in Section 4, then the
results that the fine-tuned model straightforwardly enables us to derive in Section 5.
There will be more to say of this in Sections 6 and 7.

3. A PUZZLE RAISED BY THE STANDARD MODEL
The model as just elaborated raises an interesting normative question: How is the SWF’s
aggregation rule, which functions as a normative principle of distribution for the society
whose welfare is both measured and to be optimized per the SWF in question, to be
determined? How, for that matter, is the domain of arguments that the multivariate SWF
takes, which also bears distributive consequences, for its part determined?21 And how,
finally, might the considerations by reference to which one addresses those questions be
given explicit expression in the welfare theorist’s would-be “complete” SWF?
As to the first two questions, it might be tempting, particularly to those who have
not happened to notice the normatively critical distinction between preferences on the one
hand, and normative standards that are incumbent upon preferences on the other hand,22
to suppose that the argument domain and aggregation rule might themselves be selected
by reference to preferences. “Take a poll,” you might say; “put it to a vote.”
A moment’s reflection, however, suffices to satisfy ourselves that recourse to
preferences, in selecting an argument domain and aggregation rule that effectively
distribute the satisfactions of preferences, simply defers the question that it purports to
answer. For we shall of course now have to choose from among and aggregate the
preferences expressed in respect of the normatively appropriate argument domain and
aggregation rule themselves.
What “second-order” choice of argument domain and aggregation rule are we
then to employ in counting and aggregating the preferences by reference to which we
would select the first, “first-order” argument domain and aggregation rule, whose
20

Once again, “by their fruits ye shall know them”: For example, “These people value the
blondes among them more highly than the brunettes, as evidenced by the fact that blondes’ preference
functions are weighted more heavily than those of brunettes in determining that normative measure they
call ‘social welfare.’”
21
See the last paragraph but two in the previous Section. Also supra, notes 5, 11.
22
Please see again note 4 in this connection.
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selections set us off on this course in the first place? Shall we take another vote? If so,
won’t that just replicate the original problem? Clearly we’re off on a regress. And as
was once sagely observed, the trouble with a regress is not that it has no end; it is that it
has no beginning. It is ungrounded, we don’t understand any of its terms. (See
Wittgenstein (1984: 693).) Hence we are faced with a clear case of normative
indeterminacy – thus far at least.
Now it is natural enough in such cases to propose that the selection of an
argument domain and aggregation rule, fraught with distributive import as they are, be
conducted by vote, with the votes in turn counted and aggregated pro rata. The
suggestion seems only fair. But the crucial words here, I think, are those words “natural”
and “fair.” We are drawn to such focal points, one suspects, in virtue of a natural
resonance they have with a standard of fairness that we find antecedently compelling, one
that operates independently of – indeed, as “compelling” suggests, one that “compels” or
at any rate guides and in that sense determines – our decisive or operative preferences
themselves.
This is surely the case with most, if not all SWFs. Certainly it is the case in
respect of all normatively constructed, selected, or employed SWFs. Social welfare
theorists, when they are careful and normatively prompted, choose argument domains
and aggregation rules in keeping with conceptions of distributive propriety.
Utilitarians, for example, are commonly heard to defend utilitarian SWFs by
reference to the putative egalitarian fairness imminent in their counting each individual’s
utility function “only once.” (See, e.g., Smart (1973).) It is far from clear, of course,
why counting utility functions equally is any more normatively compelling than would be
counting thigh-length or forehead-height-functions equally, at least if the former are
genetically accidental as are the latter. (See Hockett (2009a).) But that’s neither here nor
there for the moment.
The critical point for present purposes is that the SWF’s argument domain and,
especially, its aggregation rule register an antecedently operative normative distributional
standard which, in determining how preferences are aggregated in reaching a measure of
social welfare, operates both as incumbent upon individual preferences and as
constitutive of the theorist’s working conception of “welfare” itself. Theorists work with
a guiding idea of (a) who is entitled, as a matter of normative priors, to be counted, in
virtue of what normatively interesting attributes, and (b) how one counted party’s
interests are to be comparatively weighed as against others’, and why.
Judgments of fairness accordingly determine these theorists’ measures, and in this
sense determine their very conceptions, of social welfare. The values that determine their
choices of argument domain and aggregation rule, that is to say, are constitutive of – they
are “internal to” and definitive of – their views of what counts as welfare itself. Welfare
is fairly aggregated satisfaction.23
23

See also supra, notes 4, 5, 11, 21, and associated text. In this connection, locutions like
“fairness versus welfare,” which figures into the titles of a surprising number of publications (see Kaplow
& Shavell (1999, 2000, 2002, 2003), looks transparently to register a category confusion, a confusion that
one suspects stems from the same source as that noted above in note 4. An immediate hint that something
has gone wrong is the fact that “fairness” names a pattern of distribution, while “welfare” on the dominant
preference-satisfaction understanding names an object of distribution. “Fairness versus welfare”
accordingly rings a bit as would “velocity versus projectile.” But recognition that a conception of fairness
is internal to a conception of welfare itself tends to sharpen the sense in which the locution can be seen to
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The trouble, it turns out, is that the standard SWF model as presently rendered
offers no means of explicitly registering this fact. This gap in the standard model
accounts, in turn, not only for much confused talk about welfare to fairness “tradeoffs,”24
but also for obscurity, to date, about what the results next derived in Section V show. It
also amounts to a sense in which the standard model as presently configured falls short,
for the time being, of those normative-theoretic completeness ambitions that originally
prompted its introduction and continue to prompt its use. (See again Bergson (1938),
Samuelson (1947). Evidence of this motivation’s continued force is found, e.g., in
Kaplow & Shavell (2001, 2002).

4. THE MODEL SHARPENED
I turn now to fine-tuning the standard model with a view to enabling it explicitly to
register the preference-incumbency just considered – that of those normative standards
which guide the theorist in determining any SWF’s argument domain and aggregation
rule, what one might call its “distributive structure.” Once these minimal adjustments to
the standard model are in place, the formal results derived in Section 5 are
straightforwardly derived, and their import transparently manifest.
DEFINITION 1: A preference-regarding social welfare function, Wpr, is a
composite social welfare function of the form W(● ,…, U1(x), …, Um(x)) the immediate
domain of (non-“dummy” arguments of) which includes, but need not be limited to, m
individuals’ preference functions Ui, and that is monotonically increasing in the value of
each of its individual Ui arguments. It is of course possible in such case that there exist x,
x’ є X such that Ui(x) = Ui(x’) for all i and yet Ws(x) ≠ Ws(x’). It is also the case here that
n might exceed m. In such case Wpr could be characterized as “elitist.” (The preferences
of some members of N “would not count.”) If m were precisely 1, Wpr could be
characterized as “despotic,” “monocratic,” or, approximately though not fully following
Arrow (1951), “dictatorial.”
COMMENT 1: “Preference-regard” corresponds to what some since Samuelson
(1947) have called “individualism,” and what some since Sen (1979) have called
“welfarism.” Because regard for persons’ preferences is what is in fact distinctive here,
while “individualism” is quite imprecise and “welfarism” encourages conflation of the
mere “is” of positive individual demand with the traditionally more ethically resonant
“ought” of normative social or ethical command, I believe we’ll do well to regard
“preference-regard” as the preferable term.

be a category error. For fairness now can be seen to constitute what one might call the “form” of welfare,
while preference-satisfaction constitutes the “substance” thereof. Welfare, in short, just is this: Fair
satisfaction. It is appropriately distributed satisfaction. If this is correct, then to say “fairness versus
welfare” in the domain of law and policy design is a counterpart to what it would be to say “threeleggedness versus wood” in the domain of furniture design.
24
See supra notes 4, 5, 11, and 23. “Fairness versus welfare” is simply the reductio ad absurdum
of this impossible line of thought.
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DEFINITION 2: A strictly preference-regarding social welfare function, Wspr, is a
preference-regarding social welfare function of the form W(U1(x), …, Um(x)) the domain
of (non-“dummy” arguments of) which is restricted to individuals’ preference functions
Ui alone. Hence it is a social welfare function for which there exist no x, x’ є X such that
Ui(x) = Ui(x’) for all i and yet W(x) ≠ W(x’). Thus the following hold true: ∀i є N; x, x’ є
X: Ui(x) > Ui(x’) . ⊃ . Wspr (x) > Wspr (x’). And: ∀i є N; x, x’ є X: Ui(x) < Ui(x’) . ⊃ .
Wspr (x) < Wspr (x’).
COMMENT 2: “Strict” preference-regard corresponds to what most others (than
those mentioned in Comment 1) since Sen (1979) have called “welfarism.” Because it is
possible for an SWF to respond positively either to preferences alone, or to such
preferences along with one or more other factors that a theorist might find to render a
world better when present therein, we require an adjective that can distinguish between
the two cases. “Strict” seems a fitting such adjective given its analogous employment in
other formal contexts.
DEFINITION 3: An explicitly standard-regarding, or equivalently, normatively
complete social welfare function, Wsr, is a social welfare function that gives complete and
explicit expression to the normative standards or value judgments that prompt its design
and construction – in particular, those that determine its argument domain and its
aggregation rule. A non-explicitly standard-regarding, or equivalently, normatively
incomplete, or merely descriptive social welfare function is simply a social welfare
function that is not complete and explicit in this sense. Note that an explicitly standardregarding social welfare function can also be preference-regarding. But as reflection on
Definition 2 will immediately suggest, it is difficult to see how a standard-regarding
social welfare function could be strictly preference-regarding.25
COMMENT 3: The distinction between an explicitly standard-regarding,
normatively complete SWF on the one hand, and a non-explicitly standard-regarding,
25

A perspicuous symbolism would render this incompatibility immediately apparent. The
simplest way would be for it to take the form displayed in Definition 1, with at least one “●.” This would
register the normative standard or standards to which the SWF had explicit regard. It is essentially the want
of transparency of this sort that accounts for the failure of Section 5’s results thus far to have been noticed.
An adequate formalism would wear what the proofs reveal on its face.
“But doesn’t the prefix, ‘Max,’ typically found before SWFs, itself suffice fully to register the
normative character of the theorist’s SWF?,” someone might ask. “After all, it is an order.” The answer is
no. For people can issue demands in the form of commands, without the commands’ thereby acquiring
normative status – i.e., without their becoming incumbent upon the preferences of those to whom the
demands are issued. Such commands as those issued by slaveholders, for example, or by brigands
demanding you “stand and deliver are attempted conscriptions rather than normative prescriptions. (See
Hockett (2009c) for fuller discussion of this matter.)
What distinguishes normative social prescription from mere attempted conscription is that the
former can be justified by explicit reference to generally applicable normative principles – precisely those
items that guide the choice of an SWF’s argument domain and aggregation rule. The minimal counterpart
of this form of explicit reference to normative standards in an SWF is the “●”. The dot is a stand-in for
those normative standards to which the theorist might explicitly appeal in reply to an individual who, in
response to the theorist’s order to maximize the SWF, rejoins that like Bartleby the Scrivener, she would
“prefer not to.” (See Melville (1856).)
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normatively incomplete, or merely descriptive SWF on the other, bears crucially upon the
uses to which social welfare functions might be put.26
As noted in the final paragraphs to Section 1, a social welfare function ordinarily
employed (incompletely) to formulate normative theoretical judgments might be used
instead, advertently or inadvertently, simply to formulate a descriptive report. Such a
report might be, say, a description of resource allocations over individuals with which
corresponding levels or amounts of some positive (not necessarily normative) aggregate
output (GDP, for example, or “hedonic pleasure” as measured in endorphins) are
empirically associated. Such outputs would be, strictly speaking, matters in respect of
which the theorist effectively reserved normative judgment, not committing herself to any
particular normative theoretical attitude.
Another circumstance, likewise envisaged at the end of Section 1, in which
theoretic incompleteness might do little or no mischief would be that in which one wishes
to frame an instruction meant to guide functionaries in doing their jobs. In such cases the
SWF would not be meant to give complete or transparent expression to the full
complement of a theorist’s nameable value commitments with a view to tracing all
logical consequences thereof. It would be meant simply to guide actions on the part of
others who take orders from above, hence employed to formulate an instruction rather
than a complete value judgment.
Social welfare functions often seem to figure in these less normative-theoretic
ways in the social choice literature, as well as in governmental budget offices, suggesting
that it would be helpful to have to hand some formal means by which SWFs might be
made transparently to indicate whether they are giving full expression to complete and
fully articulated normative value judgments on the one hand, or merely descriptive
reports or instructions on the other hand, on particular occasions of use.
The want of a standard, straightforward, unequivocal formal indicator marking off
social welfare functions in their normative theoretical as distinguished from their positive
or pragmatic employments accounts, I conjecture, for frequent conflations of positive
preference with normative principle, hence ultimately of “is” with “ought,” in much of
the welfare economic and social choice literature.27
The next concept is introduced in order to give expression, in the apparatus of
SWFs, to one particular evaluative judgment to which anyone who normatively inquires,
judges, or prescribes with full articulation appears to commit herself, at a bare minimum,
in any act of normative inquiry, judgment or prescription. It is an implicit judgment that
comes to light – a “second-order preference” that is “revealed,” so to speak – the moment
we take care expressly to distinguish normative theoretic from descriptive or pragmatic
inquiry or activity.
DEFINITION 4: A social welfare function W is incumbent, or equivalently,
decisive, insofar as a theorist actually conducts or communicates normative-theoretic
assessments of possible worlds either with it, or, derivatively, pursuant to the principles
26

The idea that the uses of expressions bear upon their meanings is of course not unfamiliar. See,
e.g., Wittgenstein (1953). The link is of course also manifest in regular treatment of the word “usage” as a
rough synonym for “meaning” itself.
27
There are other sources of this conflation as well, one suspects. A remark of Pareto’s ((1909):
318) is apposite: “In general, men are prone to give their private demands the form of general demands.”
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to which it gives formal expression. Note that W’s being incumbent or not is a feature of
the world, hence is partly constitutive of any x – i.e., any state of the world as given
complete normative description per the second paragraph of Section 2.
COMMENT 4: The fuller significance of incumbency emerges in Axiom 1, below.
See also Sections 1 and 3 above, in which this concept and its prompting considerations
are first broached. I’ll address anticipated objections to incumbency, and to the claim
made immediately below concerning normatively complete social welfare functions’
valuing their own incumbency, further below in Section 6.
I now request the reader’s assistance in assessing the self-evidence or otherwise of
the following axiom, which I for my part see no way of sincerely denying:
AXIOM 1—Minimal Normative Incumbency: All else being equal, an explicitly
standard-regarding social welfare function Wsr deems a world better, i.e., assigns to it a
higher value along ℝ, if Wsr is itself incumbent in that world. Somewhat more formally,
∀x, x’ є X , if x is a world in which Wsr is incumbent and x’ is an otherwise identical
world in which Wsr is not incumbent, then Wsr (x) > Wsr (x’).
REMARK 1: Here is the sense in which the Axiom seems to me undeniable: If I
engage in normative inquiry, then I judge normative inquiry to be a good thing to do.
The judgment appears to be latent in my deliberate engagement in this form of inquiry
itself, rather as first-order preferences are said to be “revealed” by trading or consumption
behavior. (Assuming that I am not merely “acting out” an addiction of some sort.)
But if I judge normative inquiry a good thing, then, since the way in which I give
expression to my judgments of good and ill, better and worse, and so forth in the idiom of
SWFs is by assigning numeric values to “worlds” in response to their featuring such good
or bad things, I must in consequence judge the world better for my engaging in normative
inquiry in it. At least that is so inasmuch as I am indeed in the world. A good thing
happens in the world by dint of my doing the good thing that is engaging in normative
investigation in that world. Hence the world is a better world, ceteris paribus, for my
doing so. And my normatively complete, explicitly standard-regarding SWF registers
this fact, like any other world-bettering fact, by assigning the world a higher numerical
value in virtue of the fact’s obtaining.
Note also that the incumbency registered in Axiom 1 as being valued by the
standard-regarding SWF is, as the name of the Axiom suggests, indeed minimal. It
involves no more than the function’s registering the value of the theorist’s engagement in
her normative analysis. In the actual world that we inhabit, many if not most theorists –
particularly those in the academy – appear effectively to value a significantly stronger
form of incumbency: Theorists generally endeavor, through reasoned argument, to
convince others to “see things their way,” normatively speaking. That is to say, they seek
to convince others to favor the same policies, for the same normative reasons – on the
basis of the same normative standards or principles – as do they.28 Their actions

28

See Hockett (2009b) for further development of this observation.
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accordingly bespeak their valuing the incumbency of their particular principles upon the
analyses of others as well as upon themselves. That’s more than minimal incumbency.
Here, though, again, we restrict ourselves to the minimal, least contestable claim
in respect of the standard-regarding SWF’s valuation of its own incumbency. That is, per
Axiom 1, its simply registering the good, in the theorist’s judgment, of the theorist’s
seeking to ascertain and employ the normatively most appropriate social welfare function
itself. The form of recursion that this imports into the SWF is nothing other than the
normatively complete SWF’s full reflection of the theorist’s activity itself, which is itself
reflective inasmuch as the theorist does what she does in the world to whose states her
SWF assigns values.
The next concept is implicit in any multivariate function. But it is implicated with
particular salience by the distinction between normatively complete and incomplete
SWFs, as we’ll presently see:
DEFINITION 7: Call a subset (○) or (●) of a function’s full set of arguments (●, ○) a
“subdomain” of the function. Where (○) is the set of individual preference-functional
components of a preference-regarding social welfare function Wpr’s full set of arguments,
call it Wpr’s “preference subdomain.” Finally, call Wpr as applied to its preference
subdomain alone the “preference-regarding subfunction” Wpr/○ of Wpr.29 We shall then
say that a preference-regarding social welfare function Wpr’ preference-wise replicates
(symbol “≈ ○”) another preference-regarding social welfare function Wpr in world x when
and only when Wpr and Wpr’ share a common preference-regarding subfunction with
respect to x. Wpr’ preference-wise replicates Wpr, that is to say, when and only when Wpr
and Wpr’ share a common preference subdomain with which is associated the same world
and numeric value pair (x, R). Somewhat more formally, Wpr (x) ≈ ○ Wpr’(x) . ≡ .
Wpr/○(x) = Wpr’/○(x).30
COMMENT 7: The concept of one SWF’s preference-wise replicating another is
introduced to afford ready means of registering an obvious but seemingly oft-ignored
prospect: namely, that (a) two such functions’ argument domains might be coextensive
with respect to the individual preference schedules that are among (or that exhaust) their
elements, and (b) the persons whose individual preference schedules are thus shared by
the functional domains might receive identical allocations of resources in two worlds x
and x,’ all while (c) the two functions nevertheless do not assign x and x’ the same values
along ℝ precisely because some feature of worlds to which some other element of a
function’s full argument domain might be sensitive varies between worlds. Precisely this
29

The computational term “subfunction” seems intuitively apt here in light of its resonance with
the familiar “subdomain.” Mathematical purists will recognize “subfunction’s” synonymy with the more
traditional set- and function-theoretic “restriction.” If D is the domain of W(●, ○), D● the subset of D’s
“●” factors, and D○ the subset of “○” factors, then since W is W: D → ℝ, the subfunction W○ is simply the
restriction of W to D○, i.e., W│D○, or W○: D○ → ℝ.
30
By way of paradigmatic example, if W(●, ○) is a weighted sum of its arguments, then W(○) is
the subfunction resulting when we “drop” – weight at zero – all arguments (●). Where (○) is the set of
individual preference functional components of a preference-regarding social welfare function Wpr’s full
set of arguments, W(○) is what I am calling “Wpr/○.”
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prospect is raised by the distinction between normatively complete and incomplete
SWFs. Its not having been generally remarked in the literature is a consequence, I
believe, of a tendency found in much of the literature to elide the distinction between
complete normative prescription and mere positive description, a tendency reinforced by,
if not rooted in, the tendency to collapse normative standard or principle into positive
preference.
The sense in which the just-described prospect to which preference-wise
replication gives expression emerges from the distinction between complete normative
prescription and mere positive description is this: As noted above in connection with
Definition 3, SWFs might, but need not, be employed to formulate complete and explicit
normative judgments or prescriptions. That is to say that they might, but need not, be
rendered normatively incumbent by registering or figuring into actual normative
judgments or prescriptions concerning described possible worlds. For again, as noted
above in Comment 3, a function can be employed to describe or locally prescribe
allocations of individually preferred benefits, dispreferred burdens, and so forth over
individuals, and can correlate “levels” or “amounts” of some conceived social aggregate
that varies in response to varying such allocations, without thereby committing the
theorist to any complete normative judgment or global prescription concerning those
allocations or associated aggregates.
Insofar as the theorist remains indifferent or agnostic about whether it be
generally “good” or “ill” that others’ preferences be satisfied or no, for example, she need
not value or, therefore, express valuation of the normative incumbency of the SWF with
which she tracks and registers such patterns of preference-satisfaction or -dissatisfaction.
Her SWF will in such case remain, per the terms of Definition 3, either normatively
incomplete or merely descriptive.31 By contrast, the moment the theorist (a) adopts a
normative stance or formulates a normative judgment as to the goodness or otherwise,
generally speaking, of the pattern of satisfactions and dissatisfactions registered by her
SWF, and (b) elects to employ the latter to give what theorists call “complete” expression
to her value judgment, the SWF will come to value its own incumbency in addition to
valuing the preference-satisfactions experienced by those whose preference schedules
figure into its argument domain. (See, again, Axiom 1.) It will accordingly preferencewise replicate (and of course be replicated by) its merely descriptive counterpart, even
while adding at least one non-preference-grounded argument – viz., that associated with
its own incumbency – to those features of possible worlds in virtue of which it assigns
variable numerical values to worlds.
I now request the reader’s assistance once more, in reflecting upon and assessing
the self-evidence or otherwise of the following axiom, which, like Axiom 1, I can see no
way of sincerely denying:

31

In view of the normative coloration of such words as “welfare,” it would of course be preferable
in such case to call her SWF something like an “aggregate preference-satisfaction function” (an “APSF”?)
rather than a “social welfare function.” But I’ll leave that terminological gripe to one side for the present,
contenting myself with the “explicitly standard-regarding,” “normatively complete” and “globally
prescriptive” versus “non-explicitly standard-regarding,” “normatively incomplete” and “descriptive” SWF
terminology introduced above. More on these matters in Hockett (2009a, b, c).
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AXIOM 2—Replicability: For any normatively complete preference-regarding
social welfare function Wsr/pr, and any possible world x, there is a strictly preferenceregarding social welfare function Wspr which preference-wise replicates Wsr/pr in x.
REMARK 2: Simply take Wsr/pr’s preference-regarding subfunction Wpr/○, by way
of immediate example.32

5. TWO IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS
I turn now to the results mentioned above in Section 1, which are readily derived in the
augmented model. The first result concerns strict preference-regard (a.k.a. strict
“welfarism”). The second, derived in the next Section, concerns Paretianism.
5.1 The Impossibility of Strictly Preference-Regarding Social Evaluation
LEMMA: If all persons i whose preference functions jointly constitute the
preference-regarding subfunction Wpr/○ of a preference-regarding social welfare
function Wpr assign the same value to two worlds x and x’, then so does the subfunction.
Formally, ∀i: Ui(x) = Ui(x’) . ≡ . Wpr/○(x) = Wpr/○(x’).
PROOF: This is immediate from Definition 7 of a preference-regarding
subfunction of a social welfare function and Definition 2 of a strictly preferenceregarding social welfare function. ■
We’re now positioned to derive strict preference-regard’s formal inconsistency
with normatively complete social evaluation.
PROPOSITION 1: No normatively complete social welfare function is strictly
preference-regarding.33
PROOF: Assume a world x in which the standard-regarding social welfare function
Wsr is incumbent. Assume, per Axiom 2 (Replicability), another world x’ in which Wsr is
32

It is worth noting in passing that replicability is straightforwardly connected to a familiar
entailment of the “fundamental theorems” of welfare economics – viz., that for any efficient allocation x,
there exists some SWF whose domain comprises a weighted sum of concave, continuous and
monotonically increasing preference functions that x maximizes. (See, e.g., Varian (1992): 333-35.) Such
SWFs would be, in an infinite number of cases, quite arbitrary from the point of view of any known
normative standard or principle that might actually prompt and guide normative assessment. (See Hockett
(2009b, c) for more on this point.) Insofar as it is normatively or prescriptively arbitrary, in turn, such an
SWF will be merely positive or descriptive; it will do no more than mathematically characterize an
allocation, irrespective of any recognized or indeed recognizable sense in which that allocation is socially
“rightful” or “good.” It will at best serve as a post hoc “rationalization,” or rubber stamp, arbitrarily
deeming normatively “optimal” any randomly selected positive allocation. That’s what one might call,
alluding to the Essay on Man (“what ever is, is right”), “Pope with a vengeance.” (See Pope (1732).)
33
Note that, by Definition 3, if this Proposition holds true, then a strictly preference-regarding
SWF can at most be descriptive.
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preference-wise replicated but not incumbent. We then know the following to hold true:
By Observation 1, Wsr(x) > Wsr(x’). Hence Wsr(x) ≠ Wsr(x’). But by Replicability and
the Lemma, Ui(x) = Ui(x’) for all i. Hence by Definition 2, Wsr is not strictly preferenceregarding. ■
5.2 The Impossibility of Preferential Paretian Social Evaluation
Any form of Paretianism that interprets “better” and “worse” in terms of
preference-satisfaction as described in Section 1 is readily shown to inherit strict
preference-regard’s inconsistency with normatively complete social evaluation, as we
now demonstrate.
DEFINITION 9: A social welfare function W is “Paretian” if and only if it satisfies
one or more of the Pareto indifference (PI), weak Pareto (WP) or strong Pareto (SP)
conditions. Somewhat more formally: Either PI holds of W, i.e. ∀i є N; x, x’ є X: Ui(x) =
Ui(x’) . ⊃ : Wp (x) = Wp (x’); or WP holds of W, i.e., ∀i є N; x, x’ є X: Ui(x) > Ui(x’) . ⊃ :
Wp (x) > Wp (x’); or SP holds of W, i.e., ∀i є N; x, x’ є X: Ui(x) > Ui(x’) & ∃i є N; x, x’ є
X: Ui(x) > Ui(x’) . ⊃ : Wp (x) > Wp (x’).
COMMENT 9: So-called “full Pareto” (FP), defined in the literature as the
conjunction of PI and SP, is of course trivially embraced by Definition 9. Definition 10
and Proposition 2, below, will afford warrant to our lumping all versions of Pareto
together as here.
SUPPOSITION—Normal Good Profile: There might exist at least one indefinitely
divisible resource, or profile of such resources, r, which, were every individual i to
possess an increment ε > 0 more of it, would leave each individual i’s preferences more
satisfied. Somewhat more formally, taking ri /r(x) for each person i’s allotment of r in
world x, and ri /r(x’) for i’s allotment of r in world x’, we have ∀i є N: ri /r(x) – ri /r(x’) =
ε . ⊃ . ∀i є N: Ui(x) > Ui(x’).34

34

One could word this somewhat more technically by saying that each Ui is responsive only to i’s
own allotment, not to others’ allotments, of the resource r and is at least weakly continuous and
monotonically increasing in that allotment. See, e.g., Suzumura (2001). By “weakly” continuous here I
mean simply that if ri /r (x) > ri /r (x’), then there is a neighborhood V(ri /r (x’)) of ri /r (x’) all of whose
members ri /r (x) exceeds. See, e.g., Campbell & Kelly (2002).
I proceed for the most part in what follows as if the Supposition is to be understood in terms of the
single resource r, but do so only for the sake of simplicity in exposition. The same idea could, with a bit
more complexity, be put forward in terms of each individual i’s preferring x’ to x by virtue of the former’s
yielding an added increment of some resource or other feature of the world represented by “r,” the specific
r’s potentially differing from individual to individual, each being anything at all by virtue of which
somebody might prefer a possible world. (The r’s might, that is to say, be indexed by individual, such that
r for person i1 is r1, for person i2 is r2, etc. In such case “r” will designate, not a single resource, but a
profile of resources corresponding to a set of individuals.) Thanks to Matt Adler for emphasizing this
prospect in conversation.
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REMARK 3: This supposition serves as a counterpart to the “Assumptions”
hypothecated in several proofs cognate to that offered below, including, e.g., Suzumura
(2001), and Kaplow & Shavell (2001), which restrict themselves to a single good. A
profile of goods, such that different goods play the same role for different persons, will
do just as well. I trust that the reason for the name is clear: The resource (or profile) here
specified affects preference-satisfaction precisely as do the normal goods familiar to price
theory.
It should be noted that the Supposition serves indeed as a conditional supposition,
rather than as a committal assumption or axiom. It is set forth in order both to set the
stage for and to make plain the full significance of a definition, namely that of a
“preferentially Paretian” social welfare function, which is defined, next, as a social
welfare function that behaves in particular ways when and if ever the Supposition might
hold, but need not so behave when the Supposition does not hold.
DEFINITION 10: A social welfare function W is preferentially Paretian if and only
if for each individual i it is at least weakly continuous and monotonically increasing in ri
/r(x) when ever the Normal Good Profile Supposition holds. (That is to say, W is itself
weakly continuous and monotonically increasing in each individual’s allotment of the
resource r.)
COMMENT 10: Specifying a few implications of Definition 10 in prose might
facilitate more immediate intuitive grasp of the next proposition and proof as well as of
their import. Here then is the intended interpretation:
A preferentially PI social welfare function allows no value apart from preferencesatisfactions – including, for example, incumbency per Definition 6 above, which any
standard-regarding, hence normatively complete or prescriptive social welfare function
per Axiom 1 will at a bare minimum count for something – to count for anything in
determining an optimum. So a preferentially PI SWF will represent the world as
unambiguously improving or worsening precisely insofar as it gains or loses – even if but
infinitesimally – in the quantum of r that it contains, quite irrespective of any
accompanying loss or gain in respect of the incumbency of some normative standard or
principle such as might find expression in the social welfare function itself. If everybody
likes ice cream, for example (and surely everybody likes ice cream), the addition of (even
an arbitrarily small fraction of) one scoop of ice cream to the world will be deemed by
the preferentially PI social welfare function to render the world infinitely better than, for
example, has the theorist’s having elected to ascertain and employ the most normatively
appropriate social welfare function in her normative analyses of completely described
possible worlds, even if it is this social welfare function itself that she has found to be
most normatively appropriate in this sense.
Preferentially WP or SP social welfare functions, for their parts, will not “trade
off” so much as an infinitesimally small increment of gain in r, whether the traded
increment of forgone gain is itself divided over everyone (WP) or is a traded-off
increment of gain that would be realized by but one person (SP), for any gain, no matter
how large, in respect of some other value – again including incumbency per Definition 6
above, which any standard-regarding, hence normatively complete or prescriptive social
welfare function at a bare minimum will count for something. A scoop (or arbitrarily
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small fraction of that scoop) of ice cream’s addition to the world, for example, whether it
be divided over everyone or simply added to Dick Cheney’s next Halliburton dividend,
will be deemed by the social welfare function to constitute a greater improvement to the
world than has the theorist’s having elected to look for the normatively most appropriate
social welfare function and come to employ the result – this social welfare function itself
– in normatively evaluating completely described possible worlds.
PROPOSITION 2: No normatively complete social welfare function is preferentially
Paretian.
PROOF: There are three cases to consider:
For PI: We know from Sen (1986) that where that portion of the domain of what
I have been calling a preference-regarding social welfare function which comprises
individual preferences is restricted to a unique profile of individual preference functions,
weak transitivity and Pareto indifference jointly entail what I have been calling strict
preference-regard. (See Fleurbaey, Tungodden & Chang (2003) on this point.) Here we
are indeed considering but a single such profile (recall, that of the members of N) and at
least weakly transitive social welfare orderings (both per our opening remarks in Section
2 and per Definition 10), so our preferentially PI social welfare function is strictly
preference-regarding. But by Proposition 1, no standard-regarding, hence normatively
complete or prescriptive social welfare function is strictly preference-regarding. So the
preferentially PI social welfare function cannot be standard-regarding, normatively
complete or prescriptive.35
For WP: Modify the proofs offered in Suzumura (2001), and Kaplow & Shavell
(2001), with benefit of the foregoing observations and additional observations made by
others. Do so, then, (a) partly in keeping with the sharpened, normatively more
transparent model laid out in Section 4 and employed in the present analysis, and (b)
partly in light of observations made by Campbell & Kelly (2002) concerning the
needlessly strong assumptions employed in some cognate proofs, notably that of Kaplow
& Shavell (2001): By Definition 2, we know that if a social welfare function W is not
strictly preference-regarding, then ∃x, x’ є X: ∀i є N: Ui(x) = Ui(x’) and yet W(x) ≠
W(x’). Now suppose a particular such function and two worlds x and x’ for which (a) ∀i
є N: Ui(x) = Ui(x’) and (b) W(x) > W(x’). Next suppose a world x” identical to x’ in all
respects save that each ri/r(x’) per the Normal Good Supposition has been increased by ε
35

Two additional observations are germane in the present connection: First, assuming
independence of irrelevant alternatives and unrestricted domain per Arrow (1951) – which many social
choice theorists and welfare economists, including Kaplow & Shavell themselves (2000, 2004), appear to
find attractive – Pareto indifference proves equivalent to what I have been calling strict preference-regard
even in respect of all possible profiles of individual satisfaction functions, rather than simply in respect of a
unique such profile, meaning that we could dispense with the latter assumption. See again Sen (1986).
Second, under a weak set of four assumptions, three of which – viz. (a) one indefinitely divisible resource,
in which individual Ui’s and W are (b) continuous and (c) monotonically increasing – are largely
incorporated into the analysis here, and one of which – compensability in increments of the divisible
resource – is commonly invoked in the literature of fair allocations and presumably acceptable to such as
Kaplow & Shavell as well, all three Pareto criteria have been proved to be jointly equivalent. See again
Suzumura (2001). Were we to assume compensability, then, which one suspects most Paretians would
happily do, the proof of Proposition 2 would now be complete.
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> 0, so that ∀i є N: Ui(x”) > Ui(x’). Now observe that, granted (even weak, per the
Supposition and Definition 10, not necessarily Kaplow & Shavell’s full) continuity, as
well as monotonicity, in ri/r(x’), there is some ε sufficiently small that our W, which,
recall, is assumed not to be strictly preference-regarding, will rank worlds thus: W(x) >
W(x”). In that case since, per (a) just above we have supposed ∀i є N: Ui(x) = Ui(x’), it
must also be the case that ∀i є N: Ui(x”) > Ui(x). Hence if weak Pareto is satisfied,
W(x”) > W(x). But that contradicts what we found supposing weak continuity and
monotonicity per the Normal Good Supposition. Hence the preferentially WP social
welfare function per Definition 10 relinquishes non-strict preference-regard. (It has to be
strictly preference-regarding.) But by Proposition 1, with that it relinquishes its standardregard, its normative completeness, and hence its capacity to give full expression to a
prescription.36
For SP: Strong Pareto trivially entails weak Pareto. What is true of the WP case
here is accordingly true a fortiori of the SP case. (SP ⊃ WP; WP ⊃ no prescription;├ SP
⊃ no prescription.) Hence the latter too is incapable of prescribing.37 ■
6. ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS
Here I shall briefly address a few questions that I anticipate might be raised in connection
with the fine-tuning of the standard model offered in Section 4, upon which the results in
Section 5 rely. The principal objections that I anticipate are directed to the concepts of
explicit standard-regard and normative incumbency.
It might be objected that there is no need of what I call explicit “standard-regard,”
because regard for the standard or standards that prompt the theorist’s design of her SWF
is already implicit in the argument domain and aggregation rule themselves. In effect
echoing the “early” Wittgenstein, this objector objects that standard-regard is already
“shown” in the SWF, and thus need not – or perhaps even in some obscure sense cannot –
be “said.” (The allusion is to Wittgenstein (1921): 4.121 passim.38)

36

Note that this portion of the proof goes through even when W is replaced by a weaker,
nontransitive ordering relation falling short of functionality. See, e.g., Campbell & Kelly ((2002): 80-81).
37
I’ll note here that Chang (2000a) constructs a number of interesting mixed “liberal
consequentialist,” or equivalently “Paretian liberal” social welfare functions that reject continuity. These in
effect give formal expression to the venerable mixed teleological/deontological systems of ethics pursuant
to which maximization of one or more goods is enjoined, subject to a side constraint sounding in rights to
fairness or some basic minimum. See, e.g., Fuller (1964) (jointly operative moralities of “aspiration” and
“duty”), Calabresi (1970) (lexicographically ordered “just[ice] or fair[ness]” and cost-minimization as
goals of accident law), Rawls (1971) (“right” ordered as prior to “good”), Dworkin (1977) (rights as
“trumps”) for canonical articulations. Chang’s social welfare functions also of course escape the
consequences of the proofs I here offer, particularly in such circumstances as those in which their nonParetian components kick in. The reason is clear: They are not strictly preference-regarding or
preferentially Paretian.
38
I say “obscure” sense because the distinction in Wittgenstein’s case is notoriously controversial.
As Frank Ramsey once said, “if you can’t say it you can’t say it – and you can’t whistle it either.” The
point is that, if there is anything there to be “shown,” it can be articulated too. The Tractatus, incidentally,
is notoriously and indeed deliberately self-contradictory on this point, concluding with the observation that
it has itself been all along saying what can only be shown, and is accordingly nonsensical.
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It might relatedly be objected that Axiom 1’s “Minimal Normative Incumbency”
is contestable as a matter of metaethics. Might there not, after all, be what Parfit (1984)
used to call “self-effacing” moral principles? And in all events, is any incumbency that
normative standards might indeed have upon preferences really so far reaching as to
require not only that we act in conformity to such standards, but that we seek to ascertain
them and act deliberately upon them as well?39
I cannot help but feel some sympathy with these objections.40 But I also cannot,
on reflection, seem to find myself persuaded by them. The whole point of the SWF
apparatus as employed in “pure” welfare theory, recall, is to give complete and explicit –
not implicit – expression to the full array of value judgments that enter into the social
welfare theorist’s comparative evaluation of possible states of the world. The reason for
this form of completeness, for its part, is not simply gratuitous; it isn’t a matter of
“obsessive-compulsive disorder” on the part of the theorist. It is to enable the theorist to
be fully precise and explicit about what all of her normative commitments are.
We seek full transparency of this sort, in turn, in order more readily to trace all
logical entailments of, including all logical incompatibilities possibly lurking among, the
full complement of those commitments. We want, in other words, to know what our
normative priors are getting us into, logical consequence-wise. We seek such knowledge
both in order that we might better refine these priors in response to any unintended or
unpalatable such logical entailments, and that we might better design law and policy in
keeping with them insofar as we do ultimately find them robust and compelling.
Now it seems to me that all of this effectively implies that we want, as Bergson
(1938) himself seems to have wanted, to be able to say in our SWFs all that we say by
way of justifying those value-fraught choices we make in designing our SWFs. The aim
of the SWF apparatus, that is to say, is not to enable people explicitly to “say” what in
truth they need or must only implicitly “show,” per the first objection countenanced
above. It is rather to enable one to say formally what one already says informally. We
wish to translate our vernacular – all of it that is relevant – into a more precise, logically
tractable idiom. If the SWF does not permit this, it will both fail to discharge its
appointed task, and, accordingly, fall short of effectively warranting such all-thingsconsidered normative judgments as we aim to justify by reference to it. (The “all-thingsconsidered” locution is from Davidson (1978).)
Now in the idiom of SWFs, the only way that there is to register value judgments
is by assigning possible worlds higher rankings in response to their instantiating the
values in question. And the only way to “show” this, in turn, is by opening a space for it
in the SWF’s argument domain. In simple formal languages like functional calculi, “to
be is to be the value of a variable,” quoth the oft-quotable Quine (1951: 15). It is just so
with those “values” which are the normative standards that prompt the design of our
SWFs.41 If we do not possess names for them in the language in which we conduct and
express our analyses, they cease to exist in those possible worlds to which our language
39

See infra, note 42, and associated text for additional material bearing upon this question.
I could scarcely fail to be moved by objections sounding in Wittgenstein’s Tractarian
sensibility, nor could I fail to be moved by Parfitian objections raised as forcefully as Matt Adler has done
in conversation and correspondence.
41
What is true of first-order formal languages with relational predicates and quantification quite
generally per Quine carries over to the special cases of real-valued functions and, accordingly, SWFs.
40
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assigns rankings. And that is so even though we inhabit, qua theorists, an infinite number
of these possible worlds, and act pursuant to normative standards in conducting our
analyses in them.
Without names for our standards in our SWFs, then, in short, we’re vulnerable to
the prospect of forgetting that these standards exist and are guiding our analyses. And if
we justify our SWFs to others by reference to such standards, and our SWFs are
themselves then to give full formal expression to our standards in turn per the original
Bergsonian ambition, then the SWFs themselves must offer means of referring to those
standards “by reference to which” we argue on behalf of them.
Now all of this admittedly means, of course, that the normatively perspicuous
SWF will bear a recursive structure – a capacity for self-reference. For it values possible
worlds partly in virtue of its own normative incumbency therein. (See generally Hockett
(2008b). Also Hockett (2009b, c).) But recursion is hardly alien to high theory as
practiced by economists. (See, e.g., Barberà & Jackson (2004); Bergstrom (1999);
Farmer (1999); Koray (2000); Ljungquvist & Sargent (2004); Stokey, Lucas & Prescott
(1989).)
Nor is the prospect of a recursive SWF surprising, for that matter, when we notice
that normativity and normative theory themselves always import self-reference, inasmuch
as they invite and involve self-assessment.42 Legal, policy, and social welfare theorists
are inquiring after what “we” ought to be doing. And that carries with it a question
wherein “we” consider “ourselves” – namely, the question of how “we” measure up to
the standards we employ in addressing that “ought” question. In thinking about social
welfare, then, we think among other things about ourselves – not only about how we are
faring and how we might fare, but about what we should do with a view to that faring.
It seems to me that these same considerations suffice to address any Parfitian
“self-effacement” objection that might be raised to my Minimal Incumbency axiom –
which, recall, was indeed minimal. (See supra, Remark 1.) Inasmuch as the social
welfare theorist is both (a) in the world and yet (b) prompted by normative considerations
to seek means of evaluating the world, there seems no way for that theorist not, on pain
of a species of incompleteness or opacity running contrary to the whole aforementioned
purpose of the SWF apparatus, both: (a) to assign numeric values or rankings to possible
worlds at least partly by reference to what she and/or other theorists do in those worlds;
and (b) in particular, to deem or rank worlds better, ceteris paribus, in virtue of there
being such people – social welfare theorists – in these worlds doing the sort of thing she
is doing: And that is, again, seeking the right normative principles upon which to frame
law and policy.

42

Indeed all forms of intentional action, individual as well as collective, appear to involve forms
of self-reference inasmuch as an intention is always an intention to act pursuant to the intention itself. On
this point see, e.g., Anscombe (1961); Harman (1976); Hockett (2009b, c); Velleman (2007 [1989]). It is
also intriguing, I think, that at least one prominent theory of schizophrenia and the interpersonal ineptitude
that tends to accompany it – the “Double Bind” account associated with Gregory Bateson – attributes both
to a blindspot in respect of self-reference. (See Bateson et al. (1956).)
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7. CONCLUSION
Assuming that the foregoing is sound, where does it leave us? Well, the first thing to
note of course is that all of the most notorious impossibility results familiar to the
welfare-theoretic literature, from Arrow (1951) through Koopmans (1960) and Diamond
(1965) on down through Sen (1970), Hart (1975), Basu & Mitra (2003) and others,
involve Pareto. But if the foregoing is sound and Pareto has been none but a veto of
normative standards themselves rather than something that’s normatively “attractive,”
then none of these theorems ought to have surprised us, let alone left us paralyzed or
pessimistic in the way some of these results sometimes have done. At most they should
simply confirm us in our determination to seek normatively intelligible determinants of
true welfare – i.e., welfare as shaped by plausible SWF argument domains and
aggregation rules.
I think that the analysis above also means, in this latter connection, that all
normative legal, policy, and social welfare theorists are in effect justice – i.e., “fair
welfare” – theorists.43 The only real question in future, I think, will be whether we’re
good, careful justice theorists or less conscious and deliberate, default justice theorists.
For we have seen here that every conception of social welfare incorporates, eo ipso, a
conception of fairness as well. And that is so just as surely as every SWF or cognate
ordering which serves as the theorist’s measure of social welfare is internally constituted
by an argument domain and an aggregation rule that jointly add up to a conception of
distributive propriety.
It is difficult not to anticipate that the careful new “fair welfare” theorists,
moreover, for reasons of both perspicuity and direct operational applicability, will either
dispense with or supplement maximization formulae in formulating satisfactory social
optimization programs. (They’ll presumably retain maximization formulae in modeling
individuals’ optimization decisions.) For of course any multivariate maximization
formula can be translated into an equivalent equalization formula. (See Hockett (2009a)
for fuller discussion of the implications of this.44) And working with formula of the latter
43

See Hockett (2009a, b) for fuller elaboration of the “fair welfare” ideal. Strictly speaking, the
name involves a redundancy, as we have just seen that true welfare is necessarily fair welfare. Welfare is
fairly distributed satisfaction – satisfaction derived in conformity to those normative standards that
determine the SWF’s argument domain and aggregation rule. But “fair welfare” sounds nice, and serves to
counteract the unfortunate and untenable claim advanced by some that there is some manner of “conflict”
between fairness and welfare. See also supra, notes 4, 5, and 11 on this.
44
Here, in a bit more detail, is the idea in a nutshell: The ethical considerations that go into
formulating an aggregation rule take individuals to be equals in one or another respect adjudged to be
ethically relevant. The classical utilitarian rule, for example, treats them as equals in respect of their utility
functions and thus sums over the latter in unweighted form. (Because I can’t see the ethical relevance of
utility functions for which persons are not responsible, utilitarianism seems to me fetishist for precisely this
reason; it’s like summing over randomly distributed endorphin counts, or even thigh-lengths or foreheadheights.) Now any such summand implies a complement equalisand embracing all attributes of individuals
considered not to be ethically relevant. An opportunity-egalitarian distribution rule, for example, deems
factors beyond an individual’s control to be ethically arbitrary, hence judges that such factors’ effects
should be equalized across individuals. Call the latter equalisand “ethically exogenous opportunity and
risk,” or if you prefer, simply “opportunity” for short. (The longer form’s better because we “make” some
of “our own” opportunities and risks; they’re not all of them accidents, some are what we can call
“ethically endogenous.”)
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sort directs attention both (a) to that which must be attended to in satisfactorily
addressing distributive questions, as in effect noted at the end of Section 2, and (b) to that
which can actually be done, via implementary mechanism, to ensure that the normatively
interesting social welfare aggregate per our discussion above ends up being the aggregate
that is indeed “maximized.”
The employment of social maximization formulae is, I think, no more than an
artifact of the tendency, when SWFs were first introduced, simply to project the model of
individual rational action as a species of maximizing behavior upon “society as a whole.”
But the species of distributive decision implicated by social welfare concerns is as a
normative matter critically distinct from that implicated by individual consumption
decisions.
In the latter, individual case, rates of exchange among vector components of
commodity bundles can without causing mischief simply be read off of actual
consumption behavior, which so far as price theory is concerned can be prompted by
tastes or preferences alone. In the social case, by contrast, the order is reversed: It is the
normative distributional decision that must be made first – in the choice of argument
domain and aggregation rule – in order for there to be so much as a normatively
intelligible measure of social “welfare” at all. Only thereafter is the maximandum
implied. But this means we ought to be acting, in our collective capacity, pursuant to
some such maxim as this: Distribute in the way that you ought, and the appropriate form
of maximization will follow.45
Recasting our formal social welfare inquiries and programs will of course leave
all the room in the world for carefully parsed formal treatment, including statisticalempirical treatment. (See, e.g., Baumol (1986); Fleurbaey (2008); Kolm (1971); Moulin
(1995, 2003); Roemer (1994, 1996, 1998); Sen (1992, 1997).) Indeed it demands it.46
But it leaves less room for social maximization formulae, and no room at all for either
strict preference-regard (strict “welfarism”) or the preferential Paretianism that we’ve
seen here to entail it.
Now index such opportunity individual by individual and symbolize it thus: “Oi” (Please think of
this, not as spelling out a familiar East End London ejaculation, but as standing for person i’s opportunity.)
Now call that which the individual produces out of such opportunity – something which I think our
commitments to autonomy commit us to allowing her to maximize untrammeled – “ethically cognizable
welfare,” and symbolize it thus: “WEi.” (Please think of this as standing for person i’s ethically (E)
cognizable welfare (W).) Then an opportunity-egalitarian social welfare function can be formulated either
thus: ∀i: Max ∑ WEi , or equivalently and operationally more helpfully, ∀i: Eq Oi.
The appropriately characterized – i.e., ethically contoured or “weighted” – summand in the first
formula corresponds as full complement to the equalisand of the second formula. And because the most
direct way, operationally speaking, to ensure that the first formula is satisfied is by acting on the second
formula (maximization of the first will “take care of itself,” i.e. will follow directly, upon our satisfying the
second), formulae of the second type will prove ultimately more helpful to those who implement policy.
Our attachment to maximization formulae even in the social and not just the individual context, I think, is
simply a relic. It is a relic of the conflations I’ve been at pains here to disentangle, a relic partly also of the
mathematical methods that happened to be prevalent in the most admired natural sciences during a
formative period of welfare economics, and a relic that’s now easily and best-advisedly dispensed with.
45
See supra, note 44. In short, if you are equalizing the right thing – e.g., material opportunity –
and distributing resources accordingly, the recipients of the resources will quite automatically maximize the
normatively appropriate social aggregate – e.g., equal opportunity grounded satisfaction, i.e., welfare.
46
It demands it, for example, in parsing the boundary between ethically exogenous and ethically
endogenous opportunity per note 44.
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Indeed, if there is but one lesson to draw from the foregoing Sections, it is that
while “fairness versus welfare” is a locution that is quite literally nonsensical in virtue of
fairness’s constitutivity of welfare itself, “Pareto versus welfare” would be quite apt. For
it is none but the routine deployment of a normativity-inimical, preferential Pareto that
has blocked theorists from developing a coherent conception of social welfare that
normative legal and policy theory might seek to advance.
It is now long forgotten that Pareto the man was the dubious beneficiary of a
Fascist state funeral presided over by none other than Il Duce himself, a man whom
Pareto would surely have loathed. Certainly a more fitting tribute on this, the Manual’s
centenary, would be to lay both our misdeployed Paretianism and misnamed strict
“welfarism” to rest, and move on to advancing real welfare – which has always been no
more and no less than fair satisfaction.47
School of Law, Cornell University, 316 Myron Taylor Hall, 524 University
Avenue, Ithaca, NY 14853, U.S.A.; robert-hockett@lawschool.cornell.edu
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